Since the long-run average reward optimality criterion is underselective, a decisionmaker often uses bias to distinguish between multiple average optimal policies. We study bias optimality in unichain, nite state and action space Markov Decision Processes. A probabilistic approach i s u s e d t o g i v e i n tuition as to why a bias-based decision-maker prefers a particular policy over another. Using relative v alue functions from the long-run average reward model, we present new methods for computing optimal bias. Furthermore, while the properties of discounting are lost in the long-run average formulation, we s h o w how and why bias implicitly discounts future rewards and costs. Each of these observations are motivated by examples that have applications to queueing theory.
Introduction
Bias optimality has previously been regarded as a theoretical concept in Markov Decision Process MDP theory. I t w as viewed as one of many optimality criteria that is more sensitive AMS Subject Classi cations: primary-90C40: Markov decision processes, secondary-60K25 theory y IAOR Subject Classi cations: primary-3160: Markov processes, secondary-3390: dynamic programming: theory 1 than long-run average optimality, but its usefulness in application had not been considered.
In many applications when there are multiple gain optimal policies there is only one bias optimal policy. Hence, the bias-based decision-maker need not look any further to decide between a group of gain optimal policies. We show through probabilistic arguments that bias can be used to make such decisions rather easily. In fact, in the examples we propose, computing the bias is not necessary since the bias optimal policy can be obtained directly from the average optimality equations. Furthermore, there are numerous similarities between nding bias optimal policies and nding average optimal policies. This relates the bias to the vast literature on average optimality and justi es a similar general appeal.
Discount and average gain optimality h a ve received considerable attention in the MDP literature. However, substantially less attention has been paid to bias optimality. Recently, Haviv and Puterman 5 showed in an admission control model, with one server and a holding cost, that one can distinguish between two a verage optimal solutions by appealing to their bias. Their work was extended by Lewis, et . al 8 to a nite capacity, m ulti-class system with the possibility o f m ultiple gain optimal policies. Further, Lewis and Puterman 9 showed that in the Haviv-Puterman model, the timing of rewards impacts on bias optimality. Whereas the Haviv-Puterman paper showed that when rewards are received upon acceptance and there are two consecutive gain optimal control limits, say L and L+1, that only L+1 is bias optimal, the Lewis-Puterman paper showed that if the rewards are received upon departure, only control limit L is bias optimal. This suggests that bias may implicitly discount r e w ards received later. However, these papers do not address why bias di erentiates between gain optimal policies and how the timing of rewards comes into play. In this paper, we present a new approach to compute the bias directly from the average optimality equations. This leads to sample path arguments that provide alternative derivations of the above m e n tioned results. We also discuss the similarities involved in computing the bias and the gain using the bias optimality equations and show that the policy iteration algorithm can be used to nd bias optimal policies. Discount and average optimality h a ve been considered expansively in the literature, therefore we will not provide a complete review here. For a comprehensive review refer to the survey paper of Arapostathis et. al 1 or Chapters 8 and 9 of Puterman 14 . Howard introduced a policy iteration algorithm to solve the average reward model in the nite state space case. This has been considerably extended. For example, see the recent w ork of Hern andezLerma and Lasserre 7 or Meyn 13 . In contrast, bias optimality has not received much direct attention in the literature. In fact, to our knowledge, in addition to the previously mentioned papers 5 , 8 , 9 , the use of bias to distinguish between gain optimal policies has only appeared in a short section of an expository chapter by V einott 18 . Methods of computing optimal bias were considered for the nite state and action space case by Denardo 3 and on countable state and compact action spaces by Mann 12 . Blackwell's 2 classic paper showed the existence of stationary optimal policies in the discounted nite state case and introduced a more sensitive optimality criterion now called Blackwell optimality. In essence, Blackwell optimal policies are discount optimal for all discount rates close to 1. It turns out that Blackwell optimality implies bias optimality, s o t h a t w e h a ve the existence of bias optimal policies in the nite state and action space case as well. There is also a vast literature on sensitive optimality that indirectly addresses bias optimality cf Veinott 17 . However none of these works give a n i n tuitive explanation for what the bias-based decision-maker prefers and why.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 lays out the model formulation and relevant de nitions. We show methods to compute and interpret the gain and the bias in Section 3. This is extended to computing optimal gain and bias in Sections 4 and 5. The issue of discounting is discussed in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Model Formulation
Our notation and formulation follows Puterman 14 . Consider an in nite horizon, discrete time, Markov decision process MDP with nite state space S. L e t A s be the nite set of actions available to a decision-maker when in state s. If the decision-maker chooses action a 2 A s when in state s, an immediate expected reward of rs; a i s r e c e i v ed and the system enters state j with probability Pjjs; a. Let A = s2S A s be the action space. A deterministic, Markovian decision rule d maps S into A and speci es which action the decision-maker will take when the system is in state s. A sequence of such decision rules = fd 1 ; d 2 ; : : : g is called a deterministic, Markovian policy and speci es the decision-maker's actions for each state, for all time. We s a y t h a t a p o l i c y i s stationary if it uses the same decision rule at each decision epoch. The set of such policies is denoted D 1 . E a c h policy generates a sequence of random variables fX n ; Y n ; n = 1 ; 2; : : : g where X n denotes the state of the system and Y n denotes the action chosen by policy at decision epoch n given X n . Unless otherwise noted, we assume the Markov decision process is unichain. That is, all stationary policies generate Markov c hains that consist of a single ergodic class and possibly some transient states. We n o w formalize the de nitions of gain and bias.
De nition 1 The long-run average reward o r gain of a policy given that the system starts in state s 2 S denoted g s is given by g s = lim
where the expectation is conditioned on the state at time zero and taken with respect to the probability measure generated b y . F If the Markov c hain generated by d 1 is aperiodic this sum is convergent, otherwise; replace the above sum with sums in the Cesaro sense. Remark 1 Our de nition of bias optimality restricts attention to stationary policies. This causes no actual restriction in our formulation as this set of policies is large enough to guarantee existence of a bias optimal policy. We will brie y discuss this fact momentarily.
De nition 3 For a particular policy d 1 where the last equality follows from the fact that the unichain assumption implies that the rows of P d are equal. Making the appropriate subsitution into 11 yields the result. Recall that the gain of a stationary policy d 1 We refer to 17 as the average optimality selection equations AOSE. To begin our analysis of the average optimality equations, we consider a special case of a result of Schweitzer and Federgruen 16 . In essence, the result states that solutions of the AOE must di er by a constant just as they do for the AEE. We include a simple proof for this result to keep this paper self-contained. In addition to being useful for establishing several results below, it shows that the average optimality equations do not determine the set of gain optimal solutions in unichain average reward models. Thus, the optimal gain is uniquely determined by the AOE, but the solution of the AOE is not unique. Thus, in Example 1 only g ; h satis es the average optimality equations.
Denote the relative v alue function associated with the optimal gain by h rv . That is g ; h rv is a solution to the AOE. Whereas previous work has focused on algorithmic methods to compute the bias cf. Veinott 17 , a probabilistic interpretation has yet to be established. In the sequel we s h o w that our previous observations lead to simple sample path arguments for optimal bias. where G is the set of policies that achieve the maximum in the AOE 16 for g and h for some vector w. Then 1 is bias optimal and h is the optimal bias. We refer to the above set of equations as the bias optimality equations BOE. Upon substituting 19 into 22 for the relative v alue with reference state that together with the optimal gain satis es the AOE, we h a ve the following result Proposition 4 Suppose h rv is a relative value function with reference s t a t e such that g ; h rv is a solution to the AOE. The BOE 22 can be r ewritten w = max d2G f,h rv , ch rv 1 + P d wg: . That is, the relative v alue function can be used to obtain both the gain and the bias.
We emphasize the importance of these observations in the following examples. Since we will often be interested in the di erence in the cost starting in states s and s + 1 , d e n e for a function b on S, bs bs + 1 , bs. In the following example, we s h o w t h a t w e can use this interpretation to acquire insight i n to the structure of bias optimal policies for non-trivial problems. Consider the set of policies T 1 that accept customers until the number of customers in the system reaches some control limit L 0 and rejects customers for all s L. D e n o t e t h e stationary policy that uses control limit L by L. I t i s k n o wn that there exists a Blackwell optimal policy within this set. The following lemma asserts that it is better to start with less customers in the system. We will use this result in the sample path arguments to follow. Haviv and Puterman 5 show t h a t i f t h e r e a r e t wo gain optimal control limit, only the higher one is bias optimal. Let L and L+1 be gain optimal control limit. Let c L be the bias constant for control limit L. Similarly for c L+1 . L e t = L be the reference state. Suppose we start two processes on the same probability space in state L. The previous example shows that by a n a s t u t e c hoice of the reference state a simple sample path argument can be used to show the usefulness of bias in distinguishing among gain optimal policies.
This analysis begs the question, why is the higher control limit preferred? In essence, the choice the decision-maker must make is whether to add more waiting space. If optimal gain is the primary objective, it is clear that if adding this server reduces the gain, it should not be added. On the other hand, if adding the waiting space, does not change the gain, but decreases the average cost as measured by h rv the decision-maker would prefer to add the space. The question of why the relative v alue functions measure cost remains open.
However, we can make the observation that with L as the reference state, Lemma 1 implies that h rv s 0 for s L while h rv s 0 f o r s L . Thus, the average cost is decreased by t i m e s p e n t with more than L customers in the system. Hence, the bias based decision-maker prefers negative relative v alue functions. In the next section we d i s c u s s h o w bias implicitly discounts rewards received late in the cycle using the relative v alue functions.
Bias and Implicit Discounting
Neither the interpretation of the bias as the total excess reward before reaching stationarity nor as the average reward over a cycle give a complete picture. If either were so, one might conjecture that a decision-maker using bias as the optimality criterion would be indi erent to when in the cycle rewards were received. After all, in most total reward models this is the case. Suppose we consider Example 2 except that rewards are received upon service completion instead of upon acceptance to the system. Using the bias optimality equation 22, 9
showed that if there are two gain optimal control limits, it is in fact the lower control limit that is bias optimal. Thus, by c hanging when rewards are received, we h a ve c hanged which control limit is preferred. This result can easily be obtained using a sample path argument similar to Example 2.
Example 3
Consider the M=M=1=k queueing system of Example 2 except that the rewards are received upon service completion instead of acceptance. Assume L and L+1 are gain optimal control limits and consider the gain optimality equations. Hence, h rv L + 1 =h rv L = 0. Furthermore, since we assume that it is not optimal to reject arriving customers when the system is empty L 0, we k n o w that h rv 0 0.
Thus, since h rv 1 h rv L = 0 , h rv 0 0 a n d h rv s 0 f o r s L . When a departure is the rst event starting in state L the average cost before returning to L must be negative; a reward. Applying our previous argument, the average cost accrued during a cycle would in fact be increased by adding another waiting space.
It is interesting to note that in Example 2 h rv s 0 w h e n s L , while h rv s 0 for s L. In the present example these inequalities are reversed. The bias-based decision-maker prefers the negative relative v alues.
Thus, while viewing bias as an cost reward problem is correct, it is not a standard average cost problem. This analysis does, however, allow u s t o i n terpret why bias prefers control limit L or L + 1 . In Example 2 rewards are received at arrivals and thus, the reward is received before the cost of having the customer in the system is accrued. On the other hand, in Example 3 since rewards are received at service completions the decision-maker must accrue the cost of having a customer in the system before receiving the reward. Thus, the decision-maker only chooses to increase the amount o f w aiting space if the reward is received before cost. p3j1; a = p3j2; a = p3j0; a b = p0j3; a b = 1. Let be the decision rule that chooses action a in state zero, the on that choooses ab, a n d be that which c hooses action b. Clearly, this model is unichain and g = g = g = 0. It is also easy to see that the bias constant, c , o f 1 must be zero. Suppose we c hoose f0g as the reference state so h rv 0 = 0.
By examination of Figure 2 we h a ve h rv 1 = 1, h rv 2 = ,1, and h rv 3 = 0. The stationary distributions, d , a r e = f1=3; 1=3; 0; 1=3g and = f1=3; 0; 1=3; 1=3g. T h us, the bias constants are , h rv = 1 =3 a n d , h rv = ,1=3. Notice that when the excess reward is receive d e a r l i e r i t i s w orth more ,1 compared to ,2, and when the cost is received earlier, it is more costly than later 1 compared to 2 1.
In this example, we h a ve an explicit cost that must be accrued as opposed to the cost to the system in the previous example. The bias-based decision-maker, however, must make a similar decision. If we compare to the decision-maker chooses to receive t h e i m m e diate reward and accrue the later cost. If we compare to then the decision-maker prefers not to accrue the immediate cost, despite the fact that the is a reward to be received later.
Precisely the same logic can be applied to the prior queueing example. Since the reward received later is discounted the decision-maker chooses not to accept the arriving customer.
Next we show that the sample path arguments and implicit discounting discussed in Example 5
Consider an M=M=1=1 queueing system with two arriving customer classes. Upon arrival each customer o ers a reward that is received upon acceptance to the system. Accepted is being served. However, as will also be interested in this model when the customers pay after service, we include this infomation in the state space. Hence, the state of the system is the class of customer being served, where state zero corresponds to an empty system. see Notice that if h2 h 0 it is optimal to accept class 2 customers. If h2 h 0 it is optimal to reject class 2 customers. At equality, a gain optimizing decision-maker is indi erent. Again, letting zero be the reference state and assuming that it is optimal to both accept and reject class 2 customers, we h a ve h rv 2 = h rv 0 = 0. Further, from the gain optimality equations h rv i = r i , g=, i = 1 ; 2. To compare the bias of the two Hence, it is bias optimal to reject class 2 customers.
Notice that in this example, upon subsituting the appropriate values for h rv 1 and h rv 2 in state zero, the gain optimality equations for pay o n e n trance and exit are precisely the same. Thus, the gain is the same for both models. However, when paying on entrance a t ypical reward stream might look like, fr 1 ; 0; 0; : : :; 0g whereas when paying on exit, the stream is f0; 0; 0; : : :; 0; r 1 g. When the customer must pay o n e n trance, the reward is received rst, while when they pay on exit, the cost of having customers in the system is accrued rst. Using Proposition 1, the excess reward streams become cost streams and might l o o k like fr 1 , g;,2g;,3g;::: ;, gg and f,g;,2g;,3g ; : : :; , r 1 , gg when paying on entrance or exit, respectively. Again the excess reward is discounted remember we w ant t h e maximum so that it is not worth as much if received at the end of the cycle. This makes explicit the fact that the bias also captures the desirable properties of discounting.
Conclusions
We h a ve presented a probabilistic approach t o i n terpreting bias optimality. This leads to simple sample path arguments for results that previously required more algebra and presented no intuition for why the bias optimizing decision-maker would prefer a particular policy.
Furthermore, this probabilitic analysis leads to an explanation of implicit discounting in bias.
It is important to note that the discounting captured by b i a s i s o n l y v alid for recurrent states. In fact, it is easy to constuct examples in which the bias is indi erent to receiving reward earlier or later in transient states see Veinott 18 . To capture this one must turn to more sensitive optimality criterion.
Finally, w e h a ve restricted our attention to nite state, nite action space models. The authors hope that this paper makes apparent the need to develop these ideas on more general spaces and for multichain Markov decision processes.
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